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ADVERSE CLAIMS BY NONRESIDENTS-THE
SEARCH FOR JURISDICTION
WILLIAM HARVEY REEVES *
T Is sound law-as it is good sense-that a debtor can dis-
charge his debt only by paying it to his creditor or on his
order, and a bailee may relieve himself of liability only by
delivery of the goods to the person who has exclusive right to
receive them. Sometimes, however, more than one person
claims; sometimes it is difficult to determine which of two
such claimants can conclusively give acquittance. "1... [T]he
chance of double payment is a common risk of life." 1
The state of New York long has had the law of inter-
pleader, the purpose of which was to permit the stakeholder
to compel the adverse claimants to litigate their rights, thus
to relieve the stakeholder of this danger of double liability.
In the rapidly moving economic and political changes
which occurred prior to the second World War, this law of
interpleader was inadequate to meet the problem, especially
in a great international market place such as New York
City where numerous individuals and corporations domiciled
abroad were accustomed to maintain bank accounts, carry
on commercial import and export transactions, and lodge
securities for safekeeping. In these new conditions, the ad-
verse claimants were not within the jurisdiction of the state
of New York or the United States. Therefore new and better
protection for American institutions was required, and this
was sought to be supplied by two laws, both passed in the
year 1939. These laws were known respectively as Section
51-a and Article 28-A of the New York Civil Practice Act.
The former related to adverse claims to debts payable by a
citizen or corporation doing business in New York state and
* Member of the New York Bar.
I Coler v. Corn Exchange Bank, 250 N.Y. 136, 145, 164 N.E. 882. 88
(1928).
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the latter referred to adverse claims to specific personal prop-
erty held within the state.
Thirteen years later, the New York Court of Appeals
stated the reason for the enactment of one of these companion
statutes as follows:
The enactment of section 51-a of the Civil Practice Act was
prompted by the existence of unsettled political conditions in Europe
and the Orient at a time when business enterprises owned by politi-
cal refugees were taken over by foreign liquidators appointed by their
governments. In the confusion which followed there were instances
where both refugees and liquidators made claim against New York
businessmen, banks or insurance companies for the same debt. In
those circumstances such New York debtors could not safely pay
either claimant without a judicial determination of the question as
to which claimant was entitled to be paid.2
The urge to change came by the presentation of a typical
case to the Law Reform Committee of the Bar Association of
the City of New York early in 1939 with the statement by
attorneys that new laws were needed to meet the new situa-
tion. In brief, the case was as follows: 3 A partnership in
Czechoslovakia, engaged in the sale of hops, had long sup-
plied hops to an American firm. These were sold on credit,
purchase price becoming due after the hops had been re-
ceived. At the time of the invasion of Czechoslovakia by
Germany, the American buyer owed the Czechoslovakian
partnership about $35,000. The partnership members fled
to France from where they advised the buyer that it should
pay the amount due to them there. The American buyer also
received a demand on what appeared to be official govern-
ment paper stating that the liquidation of the company had
been decreed and that a "Kommisaar" was in charge; the
purchase price should be paid to him.
When the Law Reform Committee of the Bar Associa-
tion of the city of New York was asked to suggest legislation
which could meet this problem, it responded by proposing
2 Solicitor for Affairs of His Majesty's Treasury v. Bankers Trust Co.,
304 N.Y. 282, 291, 107 N.E.2d 448, 452 (1952).
3 Stern v. S. S. Steiner, Inc., 101 N.Y.L.J. 1810, col. 4 (Sup. Ct. April 20.
1939) (decided prior to passage of § 51-a). For case decided after passage of
§ 51-a, see note 15 infra.
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two bills which became the laws above cited. An examina-
tion of the relevant law and decisions as they existed in 1939
indicated that, to offer relief, at least eight problems had to
be met. These were as follows:
1. The existence of an adverse claim is not a defense
to an action. This had been settled in a famous decision by
Judge Cardozo in the year 1930 where an adverse claim arose
out of the nationalization by the then newly formed Soviet
Government of Russia of various corporations which had ac-
counts in banks in New York. The Government of Russia
was then unrecognized and had no legal capacity to sue in
the United States. Representatives of certain of the Russian
corporations which, by Soviet decree, had been nationalized,
sued to collect the bank accounts in these corporate names.
Judge Cardozo said:
The subject is an ordinary deposit in a bank to be sued for, if
at all, in an action founded on the debt. In actions of that order,
a refusal to pay when due is not sustained without more by the pres-
ence of an adverse claim. The defendant, if unable to interplead,
must respond to the challenge, and defend as best it can.
The argument is pressed that the danger of double liability
supplies the basis for an equitable defense, if not for any other. The
danger is not imminent . . . . But in actions at law, the danger,
whatever it may be, is no defense at all, whether equitable or legal.
. . . The defendant does not and cannot interplead the Soviet Re-
public. That being so, it must wage the battle for itself. Negligible
is the risk that by any judgment in its domicile it will be compelled
to pay again. Whatever risk it runs abroad, is one that it assumed
as part of the business of a bank.4
The sanguine assurances of the judge that the risk of
double liability was not great, were unfortunately illusory,
for in 1933, just three years later, the United States recog-
nized Russia and signed the Litvinov Agreement with Russia
and thereafter the United States became the plaintiff, the
adverse claimant, suing as assignee of the confiscator Russia
to secure the very property held in the names of Russian
4 Petrogradsky M.K. Bank v. National City Bank, 253 N.Y. 23, 39-40,
170 N.E. 479, 485 (1930).
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
corporations, the property which some of them had already
collected.
The New York Court of Appeals held that the United
States could not sue on these claims since confiscation was
against the policies of the state of New York,5 that the con-
fiscation decrees could not, therefore, be enforced by comity
and they had no extraterritorial effect. However, the United
States Supreme Court overruled this opinion.6
The United States thus collected some nine million dol-
lars which were placed in the United States Treasury. Much
of this was received without suit; in other cases, some was
collected under conditions in which the danger of double lia-
bility did not exist or, at least, was negligible. Some of the
suits however, particularly those against some of the Amer-
ican banks, were on the same cause of action for which they
had previously been sued by Russian corporations. However,
most financial institutions in this unfortunate position were
able to counterclaim for Russian obligations payable to them
or defend on other grounds and thus escape double payment.7
The funds collected remained in the Treasury until, fol-
lowing passage of Public Law 285 which became effective
August 9, 1955, claims were received against the fund on
behalf of persons who had been damaged in Russia by con-
fiscation of their property there at the time of the revolution.
2. Further examination of the problem indicated the
existence of a serious obstacle to interpleader in the legal
concept that a debt is not a "res." Unless the adverse claim-
ants to a debt are subject personally to process of the court,
no form of interpleader whatever could be used, since the
5 United States v. Pink, 284 N.Y. 555, 32 N.E.2d 552 (1940).
6 United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203 (1942).
7 Cases in which the United States Government sued as assignee of the
Russian claims include among others: Guaranty Trust Co. v. United States,
304 U.S. 126 (1938); United States v. National City Bank, 83 F.2d 236 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 299 U.S. 563 (1936); United States v. New York Trust
Co., 75 F. Supp. 583 (S.D.N.Y. 1946); Moscow Fire Ins. Co. v. Bank of New
York and Trust Co., 280 N.Y. 286, 20 N.E.2d 758 (1939), aff'd by an equally
divided Court sub non., United States v. Moscow Fire Ins. Co., 309 U.S. 624(1940) (per curiam).
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adverse claimants abroad could not be served with process
which would give the court jurisdiction over them.8
3. Payment by the stakeholder, that is, the debtor, of
the money owed, into a court or calling it a "fund" could
not make it a "res" which would support in rem jurisdiction
and service by publication. 9
4. A further difficulty existed in the concept of inter-
pleader as of the time. The right was a purely statutory one
and, as such, the statute had to be construed very strictly.
Perhaps, therefore, interpleader as then written, regardless
of whether or not there was a "res" involved, or even if the
claims were to real estate within the United States, was
purely an action in personam. This did not seem an insuper-
able difficulty, for if the court could acquire jurisdiction in
any event by service of publication where the action involved
tangible property, then obviously all that would be needed
for this purpose was redrafting of the statute to indicate
clearly the intention of the legislature. But certainly-until
the law was clarified, it might be dangerous to rest a case
on the existing statute.
The somewhat cryptic language of a leading case in New
York, cryptic because it was not wholly consistent with other
statements in the case, made clarification necessary. The
Court of Appeals had said:
There is no authority so far as we are aware holding that an
action of interpleader is one in rem, but exactly the opposite view has
been entertained. 10
5. One matter which could not be changed by state
legislation is the immunity of a sovereign against the process
of a state court or even that of a federal court, if the foreign
sovereign cares to rely on its sovereign rights. It is well
8 Cases prior to 1939: New York Life Ins. Co. v. Dunlevy, 241 U.S. 518
(1916) ; Hanna v. Stedman, 230 N.Y. 326, 130 N.E. 566 (1921). Cases sub-
sequent to 1939: Solicitor for Affairs of His Majesty's Treasury v. Bankers
Trust Co., 304 N.Y. 282, 107 N.E.2d 448 (1952); cf. Pennoyer v. Neff, 95
U.S. 714 (1877).
9 See note 8 supra.10 Hanna v. Stedman, mpra note 8, at 335, 130 N.E. at 569.
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established in our law and in the law of other countries that
a sovereign may not be sued without its consent. The various
instances in which foreign sovereigns have voluntarily re-
mitted their sovereignty and the United States as a domes-
tic sovereign has consented to be sued, did not cover this
situation.,,
6. Stay laws are unconstitutional and, therefore, can-
not give relief. Stay laws have been tried in situations
involving adverse claims and in other situations where, to
enforce a right, seemed inequitable, after every major war of
the United States and after every major depression. The
latest one in New York was passed by the legislature of the
state of New York in 1926. This provided as to actions on
insurance contracts payable in Russian roubles and for any
other payment in the United States expressed in Russian
roubles that:
"... upon application ... shall be stayed by order of the court
in which the same is pending until the expiration of thirty days next
following the recognition de jure of a government of Russia by the
government of the United States .... , 12
This the Court of Appeals also declared unconstitutional
less than a year after its passage. So, the hope that matters
could be held in abeyance until the rights of the parties could
be made more clear or that the United States had taken .9
definite position in the matter officially, was an attractive
thought but offered no practical help.
7. Even if the adverse claim was, as many were, to
security deposits in the United States held by various banks
and brokerage houses, the interpleader law was defective for
two reasons: (a) it might still be held to authorize an action
solely in personam and, (b) even if not, was a bond a "res"?
If a debt is not a "res," is the mere evidence of a debt a "res"?
11 For a discussion of the right of sovereigns as litigants, see Reeves,
Leviathan Bond-S-overeign Immunity in a Modern World, 43 VA. L. REV.
529 (1957).
12 Section 169-a of the Civil Practice Act of the State of New York related
to actions on insurance policies; Section 169-b related to the stay of certain
other actions. Added by Laws of N.Y. 1926, c. 232, declared unconstitutional
in Sliosberg v. New York Life Ins. Co., 244 N.Y. 482, 155 N.E. 749 (1927)
(unanimous decision).
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Fortunately, here, too, legislatures, following the general
change of concept of the law relating to methods of doing
business, had indicated in other laws that securities of all
kinds were or could be considered "tangible-personal prop-
erty capable of manual delivery" and, therefore, individually
or collectively a "res." But this needed to be clarified.
8. As a last deterrent, interpleader contemplated assis-
tance and protection only to the person who had no claim
to the property himself or admitted the full amount of the
debt and was willing to pay or deliver this to the court and
be relieved from liability. Suppose the claim were for a
greater amount than the debtor admitted or that he claimed
some rights against it in one way or another, perhaps for ser-
vices rendered or, if it were securities, that he held a lien on
them (lien, counterclaim, offset or general defense). Were
these available to the beset stakeholder?
Time marched on. The refugees who had fled into
France promptly began suit and moved for summary judg-
ment. The American buyer set up a defense of adverse
claims and the court, following the opinion of Judge Cardozo,
struck out the defense and entered judgment.13 The amount
of claims multiplied; banks, brokerage houses, business men,
insurance companies, were met with them. War clouds
gathered and it appeared that a European war might be
imminent, if not inevitable.
With this background, the Bar Association offered to
the legislature its bills.
Section 51-a, to protect a stakeholder against adverse
claims to a debt, was made to operate somewhat differently
from interpleader. In this new section, the non-resident is
not made a party to the action; in fact, no effort is made
to bring him into the action but instead he is given notice
of the pendency of a suit begun by the other adverse claim-
ants and is advised of his right to intervene or, if he prefers,
to begin a new action and that this right to begin a new ac-
tion or to intervene in the pending action against the debtor
13 Stern v. S. S. Steiner, Inc., 101 N.Y.L.J. 1810, col. 4 (Sup. Ct. April 20,
1939).
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is limited to one year and ten days from the date of the order.
Since notice must be mailed within ten days after the entry
of the order and is presumed to have been made on that tenth
day, this is really a one-year statute of limitations from the
time the notice is given. If the foreign adverse claimant fails
to take appropriate action within that time to enforce his
rights, his cause of action is barred, as is any other action
barred by limitation. The stakeholder then has the right to
request the court that the action be stayed until the year
shall have run. Thus, by order of the court, the adverse
claimant is invited to intervene or start a separate action and
this notice or advice forces him to proceed or abandon his
action because it commences a short statute of limitation.14
How then did this avoid the difficulties of interpleader?
It did not indicate that an adverse claim was a defense; it
did not attempt to enlarge jurisdiction, by publication, over
a debt; it did not attempt to extend the jurisdiction of the
court. Also, the United States Supreme Court had held that
a statute of limitations was effective against a sovereign
government. That Court had said:
We decide only that in the absence of such action (treaties and
other such agreements) the limitation statutes of the forum run
against a foreign government seeking a remedy afforded by the forum,
as they run against private litigants. 15
It was not a stay law because it was for a reasonable
time, one year; it was on the definite happening of an event
and the continuance of the action would be wholly controlled
14 The first case which came to the Appellate Division was the case of Klein
v. Freund, 258 App. Div. 783, 15 N.Y.S.2d 724 (1st Dep't 1939) (mem. opinion).
This was not the first case but a very early case in which relief under § 51-a
had been granted. The facts of the Klein case were almost identical with the
Stern case, note 13 supra, which induced the drafting of § 51-a but was itself
decided on summary judgment prior to the date of the passage of that act. In
the Klein case, as in the Stern case, an American company- owed money to a
Czechoslovakian company and the officers of the Czechoslovakian company fled
to Paris. There they assigned their claim against the American company to
an American citizen who immediately brought suit.
15 Guaranty Trust Co. v. United States, 304 U.S. 126 (1938). As to § 51-a
itself, see Federal Motorship Corp. v. Johnson & Higgins, 192 Misc. 401,
77 N.Y.S.2d 52 (Sup. Ct. 1948), aff'd iner., 274 App. Div. 1034, 85 N.Y.S.2d
915 (1st Dep't), appeal dismissed, 299 N.Y. 673, 87 N.E.2d 63 (1949).
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by the court. Furthermore, the stakeholder could defend in
whole or in part against any of the claims which were made.16
The law which protected the stakeholder also was of
great advantage to the refugees, for, if the stakeholder was
protected by a decision of the court and after the one year
could not be sued by anyone who, under the authority of the
invading Germans, had taken over the business, the refugees
could secure their property. This was the disposition of
many bank accounts, security accounts, insurance policies
and general commercial debts collected under judgment of
the courts, particularly during the years 1939 and 194-0.
But all problems had not been solved. Two others re-
mained and it may be stated that there is no complete au-
thoritative answer to either even at this time. What interest,
if any, should the stakeholder pay and for how long a time?
Clearly, at the end of any such proceeding, the court will
usually find that one of the claimants was entitled to be
paid and his right was properly exercised when he made due
demand. This is the most usual situation, for the case where
the stakeholder does not owe anything to either claimant
is rare.
Under interpleader, no interest ran after payment into
court, but this, after all, is a mere gesture and the successful
claimant is still deprived of the use of his funds till final
adjudication. Any lapse of time between the original time
of demand and refusal and commencement of suit is, of
course, the plaintiff's own fault and perhaps here the plain-
tiff has no equity to collect. But should penalty interest be
charged against a bank, insurance company and the like, or
should some lesser amount and for what period of time?
Courts have struggled with this problem and there is no
rule which can be called conclusive. But, in general, courts
have properly been sympathetic to a stakeholder who has
nothing to gain, but twice the value of the debt to lose, if
he cannot get protection and have frequently held that if the
28 Solicitor for Affairs of His Majesty's Treasury v. Bankers Trust Co.,
304 N.Y. 282, 107 N.E.2d 448 (1952). While the bill was pending in the legis-
lature, the constitutional problems which it would engender were considered
in Note, 39 CoLum. L. REv. 1061 (1939).
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refusal to pay were justified in the first place, interest may
not be collected.
One court, using a somewhat different statute but one
with the same import, has found that if a debtor uses the
legal facilities available, such as interpleader or its substi-
tute, then no interest should be charged, at least up to the
time when it could have safely made payment into court.
But if lie does not, a penalty interest should be charged.
To this decision there was a dissent to the effect that if
the court finds it is the type of case in which there is reason
for the stakeholder to hesitate, even though interpleader be
not invoked, no interest should be charged. The question of
interest, however, became more acute in regard to security
accounts to be considered infra.17
Here one may point out the one further difficulty, which
a debtor invoking Section 51-a for his protection may meet,
is that the statute of limitations may not be recognized by
comity as a bar in other jurisdictions. Our Court of Appeal
has held that notice under Section 51-a is not a process of
the court 18 and have expressed doubts that it would be rec-
ognized as a bar to an action in all jurisdictions abroad."
Viewed in its various aspects, Section 51-a may be either
substantive or procedural. No foreign court has yet had
occasion to pass upon it.
The statute, Article 28-A of the New York Civil Practice
Act, although lengthy, need not detain us long, for the com-
mittee which wrote it admitted quite freely that it was purely
a compilation and did not contain any new principle. Here
they were dealing with a tangible, and by legislative defini-
tion, this can be made a "res."1 It merely remained by defi-
nition and the establishment of procedure to bring in the
adverse claimant as a party to the action to determine rights
to property under the court's jurisdiction. Of course, tlhe
question as to jurisdiction over a sovereign government still
remained, but this subsequently was resolved by permitting
1 7Bank of China v. Wells Fargo Bank & Union Trust Co., 209 F.2d 467
(9th Cir. 1953).is Solicitor for the Affairs of His Majesty's Treasury v. Bankers Trust
Co., note 16 supra.19 Federal Motorship Corp. v. Johnson & Higgins, 299 N.Y. 673, 87 N.E.2d
63 (1949).
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Section 51-a to be used in such an instance, even though the
action involved a "res." 20
The law remained without change until after the war.
During this time, two circumstances occurred which made
amendment necessary. The first was a decision in the
Supreme Court, New York County, that persons claiming
to be the successor officers in a corporation were not adverse
claimants to those displaced who continued to claim their
right to act for the corporation.
... They [the stakeholders] show, to be sure, conflicting asser-
tions as to what individuals are authorized to act on behalf of defen-
dant's depositor and make demands on its behalf, but that presents
no more than a question of agency such as defendant is called upon
to decide every time a check of a corporate depositor is presented
to it. The fact that the question of agency here may be complex
rather than simple, and may involve the determination and applica-
tion of foreign law, does not convert the case into one of two
claimants.21
It will be observed, of course, that from a standpoint
of doing business, this is a claim which could create a double
liability and is, in fact, the very type of claim against which
protection is sought. To be sure, all sides may agree that
the debt is due to a particular corporation but one can't pay
a debt directly to a corporation. It exists as an entity only
in contemplation of law. One must pay the debt to an agent
authorized to receive it for the corporation. The question is
which of two agents can give acquittance for the corporation.
An amendment was accordingly made to the Civil Practic,
Act.22
It was also found, particularly in the case of banks, that
the persons to whom the banks owed a debt, for all bank
accounts are debts,23 have not been heard of for many years;
also authorized signers for corporations were missing. Som
other person claiming to be successor, perhaps with a pur-
ported power of attorney or court order for liquidation, o:'
20 N.Y. Civ. PRAc. AcT § 287-f.
21 Koninklijke Lederfabrieck v. Chase Nat'l Bank, 177 Misc. 186, 191,
30 N.Y.S.2d 518, 524-25 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd mem., 263 App. Div. 815, 32 N.Y.S.2d
131 (1st Dep't 1941).
22 N.Y. CiV. PRAC. AcT § 287-g.
23 Baldwin's Bank v. Smith, 215 N.Y. 76, 109 N.E. 138 (1915).
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representative of an estate, or the like, would make claim on
i he account and there was no other person actively claiming.
This, too, would not be a case of adverse claimants. The
possibility, however, existed that, like some financial Enoch
Arden, these lost depositors or officers of corporate depositor
would return from the dead or more likely from some con-
centration camp. The American debtors, after making every
effort to get in touch with their creditor, were also entitled
to protection here.
The question too was settled, but not until after the war,
that Section 51-a was available in the federal court, for al-
though federal interpleader is broader by its very nature
than state interpleader, it cannot extend the jurisdiction of
the court over international boundaries. 4
The authority in the federal courts to use Section 51-a
(federal interpleader was considered adequate to determine
adverse claims to a "res") may be said to rest on three sep-
arate cases, the first of which is contained in a pure obiter
dictum:
To the extent that there is danger of double liability, the defendant
may adequately protect itself by proceeding pursuant to § 51-a of the
New York Civil Practice Act .... 25
In the next case, relief under Section 51-a was granted
but as this was not a final order, the suing claimant en-
deavored to secure a writ of mandamus to compel denial of
the relief already granted and, in the argument in the United
States Court of Appeals, the case above mentioned was cited.
The court refused to grant mandamus, letting the decision
of the lower court stand. However, this was indefinite.26
In the third case, the court wrote an opinion granting
relief under Section 51-a, saying:
A Court must be alert to see that an innocent depositary of
funds is not subjected to the possibility of double jeopardy and that
no decree will be entered until all persons who have made claim to
24 Federal jurisdiction has been extended by treaties in other places in the
world such as the international settlements in China but, of course, only by
treaty. These have now been abrogated.25 Zwack v. Kraus Bros. & Co., 93 F. Supp. 963, 966 (S.D.N.Y. 1950).
26Republic of China v. National City Bank, 194 F.2d 170 (2d Cir. 1952'.
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the funds, or who claim to speak for the corporate plaintiff, have been
given an opportunity to appear and protect their rights. 27
There is no authoritative opinion from any higher federal
court.
Article 28-A was similarly amended to define adverse
claims to include claims by two groups, each of whom pur-
ported to have the exclusive right to act for a particular
corporation, and also to define the person who, by the records
of the bailee, was the person who had the right to receive
the goods.
One additional problem arose in regard to adverse claims
against securities and that was the possibility of liability for
damage for loss of market value if one of the claimants de-
manded delivery or sale of the securities and the market
thereafter declined. An effort here was made to meet this
situation by permitting any interested person to move for an
order requiring the sale of the specific personal property.
If the order was granted, then the court could direct that
the fund be paid either into the court or to a person desig-
nated by a court or retained by the person who held the spe-
cific personal property and that, if the court then found that
any of the respective claimants were entitled to interest on
that money, this should be awarded at a rate no greater than
the lowest discount rate of the Federal Reserve Bank of New
York in effect from time to time. Thus, a compromise was
made as to the rights of the claimants and the rights of the
innocent holder. The holder would be relieved of liability
for fluctuations in market value and, should the court decide
interest should be paid, would not be charged more than the
rate from time to time of the Federal Reserve Bank which
was a rough measure of the value of the money to the person
retaining it for the time being and would give some return
on the money to the ultimately successful claimant.
So the question of adverse claims and the procedures for
the protection of innocent stakeholders remained until the
year 1954 when the Judicial Council sponsored a bill for re-
vision of the old interpleader statutes, which had remained
2 7Kuerschner & Rauchwarenfabrik v. New York Trust Co., 126 F. Supp.
684, 689 (S.D.N.Y. 1954).
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untouched by the laws above discussed. These revisions were
based upon an article written by one Louis R. Frumer, Pro-
fessor of Law at Syracuse Law School.28
This proposed bill, which became law in 1954, in effect.
did five things:
1. It repealed Article 28-A (adverse claims to specific
personal property).
2. It retained Section 51-a (adverse claims to a debt)
for two purposes: (a) for anyone who cared to use it as pro-
tection against double liability for a debt; (b) where thp
adverse claimant against either a debt or a "res" was a
sovereign government.
3. By legislation it purported to permit jurisdiction
to be obtained by publication over an adverse claimant who
claimed a debt only and, thus, in effect, by legislation made
a debt a "res."
Upon compliance with order of the Court such sum of money shall
be deemed to be property within the State for the purpose of this
subdivision and subdivision 4 of § 232 [service by publication] .... 29
The question still remains unanswered-can the legis-
lature make a debt a "res"? The last court pronouncement
on the matter was in 1952 in a case in which the court held
that a debt was not a "res," but there is no decision yet as
to whether the legislature by fiat could make it so. However,
a trial judge previously had said:
Section 51-a was enacted because interpleader, as applied to a mere
debt, has been declared to be in personam, and hence not capable of
supporting service of process outside the State... a declaration which
I venture to think very well might be re-examined in the light of
repeated adjudications that a debt has a situs at the home of the
debtor.30
28 Frumer, On Revising the New York Interpleader Statutes, 25 N.Y.U.L.
REv. 737 (1950).29N.Y. Civ. PRAc. AcT § 286.
30 Koninklijke Lederfabrieck v. Chase Nat'l Bank, 177 Misc. 186, 189,
30 N.Y.S.2d 518, 523 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd iner., 263 App. Div. 815, 32 N.Y.S.2d
131 (1st Dep't 1941).
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4. It changed the interest provisions in relation to a
fund obtained from the sale of income-producing securities
from interest "from time to time," meaning, of course, the
interest rate in effect during period or periods of time while
the stakeholder may have held the fund, to a single rate for
the whole period without regard to any change in rate during
that period; that if the court shall find that the success-
ful claimant should have interest, the one rate shall be
"the lowest discount rate of the Federal Reserve Bank
of New York in effect at the time of the discharge [of the
stakeholder]. . 31
This, of course, introduced an element of chance and
uncertainty which the former rule did not have. It is quite
conceivable that the Federal Reserve Bank rate that may
happen to be in force on the date of the discharge of the
stakeholder from liability may be widely different from the
rate prevailing during most of the time that stakeholder
held the funds, particularly if the funds were held for sev-
eral years. Taking it for granted that the Federal Reserv,
Bank rate in effect during a certain period is a reasonabl.y
good indication of the value of money during that period,
it would seem much more fair to both the stakeholder and
the successful claimant to apply the rate or rates existing
over the period that the money was held, rather than the rate
that happened by chance to be in effect on the day that thf
stakeholder paid over the money at the end of the proceedings.
5. The last and really great change which was made,
however, one which may be considered a great innovation,
was the Interpleader Compact. This was designed to per-
mit the state of New York to enter into any agreement with
any other states or with foreign countries in order that ad-
verse claimants residing outside of the jurisdiction of the
courts of New York could be subject to personal jurisdiction
by New York courts. As yet no such agreements have been
made with any other state or any foreign country.
We may, at this point, sum up, for there is no answer
at once both complete throughout the world and sure to the
31 N.Y. CIv. PRAC. Acr § 285(7).
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question-how may a business man be protected against
double claims to a debt where the claimant adverse to the
plaintiff in an action begun in the United States is outside
of the jurisdiction? Within the limits of New York state,
a New York debtor may now be said to have the means to
secure reasonable protection. But today numerous New York
business entities have offices or branches outside the state
and in foreign countries, in fact, all over the world and these
offices or branches and the property there under their con-
trol may make them vulnerable to suit in these foreign
jurisdictions.
Suppose then an adverse claimant fails to appear in an
action in New York state and, following a judgment there,
the debtor pays a debt under order of the court to the other
claimant. The adverse claimant then perhaps sues in a for-
eign jurisdiction where the debtor has a branch or office.
The defense of the American business man is the decision of
the American court after the proceedings under Section 51-n
were concluded.
The question which arises is to what extent will a for-
eign court recognize the type of protection here afforded?
Section 51-a is a statute of limitations but it is really more
than that. It is a system operating under the court's juris-
diction. It is a remedy ending in adjudication. Taken as a
whole, is it procedural or is it substantive?
Our Court of Appeals has indicated there is a question
that this procedure would be recognized as conclusive in a
foreign jurisdiction, particularly in those states which do
not enforce by "borrowing" the statute of limitations of
other states where the debt was payable and where suit actu-
ally was instituted to collect it. The question, however, has
never arisen in a foreign jurisdiction, so no authoritative
answer can be'made whether, by "borrowing" or comity, the
adverse claimant's rights are cut off in another jurisdiction,
perhaps the place of his own domicile, if he can there obtain
jurisdiction of the person who he had previously claimed was
his debtor in the Section 51-a proceeding.
As to adverse claims to specific personal property within
New York, we may say that probably the amendments of
1939, now incorporated in the revision of the Interpleader
Law of 1954, give substantial protection throughout the world
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to adverse claims to personal property situated within this
jurisdiction. This, it is respectfully suggested, would be
modified only if courts outside the United States should find
that the subject matter of the action was not under their
laws a "res" and that, therefore, the United States courts
did not, in fact, have jurisdiction over the subject matter
and, thus, could not render a judgment good as against the
world to the particular item in controversy.
With the amendments of 1954, we have the further ques-
tion-can the legislature make a debt a "res"? Certainly
the courts, both federal and state, have held that it is not.
They have gone so far as to hold that it cannot even be made
a "res" by the debtor himself by calling it a "fund" or paying
it into court.32
Perhaps the time has come, however, when debts will
support jurisdiction (particularly the type of debt which is
not ambulatory, the bank account) where due demand can
be made only in a particular place or the insurance policy
payable at the home office or elsewhere in accordance with
the terms of the policy.
Lastly, there is the Interpleader Compact, so new and
untried, that its fate cannot be assessed.
The state of New York has been a pioneer in procedural
reform and a new idea should not be condemned merely
because it has never before been tried. It is part of the duty
of lawyers to be concerned with the protection of their
client's legitimate business both within and without the
United States. The encouragement of legitimate business
and the common protection of those engaged in it is part of
the functions of law. New situations will require new
remedies. The highest courts of our state and nation will
make the final pronouncement as to the validity of new laws
created to meet new problems.
32 Solicitor for Affairs of His Majesty's Treasury v. Bankers Trust Co.,
304 N.Y. 282, 107 N.E.2d 448 (1952). The case of Feuchtwanger v. Central
Hanover Bank, 288 N.Y. 342, 43 N.E.2d 434 (1942), has frequently been cited
as holding that a bank account is a "res." An analysis of the facts of the
case, however, will indicate that the court made no such decision in this action.
There, two packages of money consisting of bills identified by their serial
numbers had wrongfully been broken open and credited to an account. Here
the court found that by this wrong, a trusteeship was established in lieu of the
packages which should have been available. This was the "res."
